Tuesday, March 16, 1999 | 11:31 a.m.
A lack of adequate training and a breakdown in supervision were partially blamed for a helicopter crash during a training exercise in September that killed 12 Nellis Air Force Base airmen.
Air Force investigators had few hard answers to give the airmen's families over the weekend and were able only to offer several factors that they believe played a part in the collision of two helicopters on the night of Sept. 3.
"We share in the families' sorrow and our thoughts and prayers go out to each one," Maj. Gen. David MacGhee Jr. said. "We don't know why this happened, but we believe that the cumulative effects of a high operation tempo, low flying experience and leadership put our crews at risk."
The report estimates that at 9:32 p.m. the two HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters collided between 100 and 300 feet above the ground about 25 miles north of Indian Springs. The two helicopters and all 12 airmen were part of the 66th Rescue Squadron.
The helicopters, which were each carrying six airmen on a night training flight, were known as Jolly 38 and Jolly 39. They were flying in formation.
"We don't know which craft was turning or what caused them to hit, but from blade analysis we do believe that Jolly 38's blades struck Jolly 39 along its right side and cockpit," said Col. Denver Pletcher, accident investigation board president and commander of the Joint Combat Rescue Agency at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia.
Investigators have ruled out any chance that the accident could have been caused by a mechanical malfunction or weather, leaving only the possibility of human error, Pletcher said.
The report lists several factors that could have contributed to the crash, including the fact that at least three of the 12 airmen did not have the necessary training for the flight.
Both Capts. Philip Miller and Carl Youngblood, who were co-piloting Jolly 38 and 39 respectively, had not passed a training requirement that ensures that pilots and co-pilots are staying proficient.
Additionally Miller's records showed problems with flying in formation, using night vision goggles, and "situational awareness," or being aware of everything inside and outside the cockpit.
If Miller piloted Jolly 38's blades into the right side of Jolly 39, then senior airman Adam Stewart, who was stationed on the right side of Jolly 39, would presumably have seen the oncoming blades, Pletcher said.
In his job as "designated scanner" Stewart was responsible for keeping the pilot posted on what can't be seen from the cockpit. Stewart's records also noted problems with situational awareness and "task saturation," or being able to handle a lot of things at the same time.
All three airmen should have been held from making the flight until they had had more training, Pletcher said.
"We think that the crew mix on each of the aircraft played a major role," Pletcher said. Jolly 38, he noted, not only had a marginally qualified co-pilot in Miller, but also had a new instructor pilot in Capt. Gregg Lewis and an in Master Sgt. Matthew Sturtevant, an unqualified airman in the "gunner" position on its left side, facing Jolly 39.
"The new scanner on the right side of Jolly 39 (Stewart) wasn't ready to work the kind of demanding mission they flew that night," he added.
The airmen had met graduation requirements from formal schools, such as Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico, but they needed additional training to meet the squadron's requirements.
That additional training was hard to come by, because deployments and other factors had put extra stress on the unit.
"The bottom line is that this unit was overtasked, with a lot of pressure to perform," Pletcher said.
Over the past four years the 66th Squadron had been deployed several times and had only about 10 months of time together at Nellis for training. After subtracting authorized time off and leave, that window shrank even more.
MacGhee said that steps have been taken to prevent accidents like this from reoccurring, including making sure that training records are reviewed before a training flight and using a philosophy of easing airmen back into training after returning from deployments.
Today and tomorrow MacGhee will be attending a conference at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia with all search and rescue squadron commanders to discuss training and what can be done to eliminate deficiencies.
"We have people coming out of places like Kirkland with deficiencies, and when they get to their squadrons the operation tempo is so intense that there isn't enough time to train everyone to where we want them to be," Pletcher said. Operation tempo is the military's way of tracking how much time a unit is on operations, as opposed to training or maintenance.
Some of the airmen involved in the accident were as many as 13 1/2 hours short of the 36 required training hours. Additional time is required in a simulator, Pletcher said.
Training time is interconnected with equipment cuts and retention problems that have cut down on the numbers of experienced trainers, MacGhee said.
"Five years ago we had 670,000 people in the Air Force and now we have 370,000," MacGhee said. "We have also had a 40 percent cut in our equipment while at the same time a 400 percent increase in the contingencies that we have to respond to."
No disciplinary action has been taken against any of the supervisors or officers who allowed the airmen to fly out on Sept. 3. The findings of the investigators will be distributed to all commanding officers, who will then decide what if any action needs to be taken, MacGhee said.
archive
