Friday, June 27, 2003 | 6:09 a.m.
WEEKEND EDITION
June 28-29, 2003
Mike O'Callaghan is the Las Vegas Sun executive editor.
THE PROBLEMS THE WORLD FACES in North Korea haven't faded away. We have good reason to believe the threat from North Korea is more serious today than it was last year. Since then the North Koreans have sent the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors packing. Their continual use of nuclear threats has grown even louder in recent months. Blackmail and extortion have long been North Korea's weapons of choice when seeking success in the world of muscle diplomacy.
So what's new? Two paragraphs from an article written by James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen in the March / April 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs give us good reason to be concerned.
"The North's decision to reopen its plutonium-based nuclear program at Yongbyon poses a more critical and immediate threat, however. Prior to its suspension in 1994, most experts believe this program had already produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. The 8,000 spent fuel rods from the five-megawatt reactor contained enough plutonium for an additional four to five nuclear weapons. The IAEA monitored the freeze via seals, cameras, and on-site inspectors. It also canned the 8,000 existing spent fuel rods, placed them in a safe-storage cooling pond, and monitored them until its inspectors were expelled from North Korea on December 31.
"The five-megawatt reactor, when operational, will produce enough plutonium for one or two additional nuclear weapons per year. But the 8,000 rods represent an even more immediate challenge. If the North follows through on its threat to reopen the reprocessing facility in February, it would take just six months to reprocess all of its spent fuel and extract enough plutonium to make four or five additional weapons. This would bring Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal to between five and seven weapons by the end of July. It could have enough plutonium for one to three weapons even sooner."
Reviewing columns and policy recommendations written for public consumption would have readers believe that everything can be solved with three simple acts by our government.
Would these actions solve the nuclear threats of North Korea? No, because they don't stay bought and would soon be making additional demands. Buying the goodwill of North Korea reminds me of the man seeking office in rural Nevada. He walked into the town's only bar and yelled, "Set 'em up, drinks are on me." The local folks drank all night but on election day the campaigner received only two votes. "These folks sure don't vote like they drink," the loser remarked.
In short order, the U.S. would learn that North Korea doesn't honor promises made to nations or international organizations. It was in the process of a peace agreement with South Korea when it invaded that nation in 1950. Time and again Pyongyang has taken international agreements and abided by them until they conflicted with what it wanted to achieve.
The sale of illegal drugs and narcotics on the world market has been a producer of cash for North Korea. Also, it has become a valuable source of dangerous weapons for rogue nations. Diplomatic criticism of North Korea has shown no positive results. About the only nation that can move North Korea into the mainstream is neighboring China. China has refused to become actively engaged in changing North Korea's attitude and threat to peace. There are several good reasons to believe that China enjoys having the United States and Japan being openly challenged by North Korea. Almost all of the thinkers writing about the North Korean problem wisely advise the United States to work toward a diplomatic relationship with that country. Few of them have spent much effort determining what Uncle Sam should do if diplomatic jawboning fails. We should hope that our governm ent, while seeking a peaceful solution, also has the plans and ability to settle this problem with a devastating military s! trike. We can't afford to allow North Korea to deliver the first blow as they did in 1950.
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