Iran deal presents the U.S. with short-term victory, long road ahead

Stephen Long

Friday, Dec. 13, 2013 | 2 a.m.

After years of tension over Iran’s nuclear program, the P5+1 negotiations have achieved a breakthrough in the form of an interim agreement limiting the expansion of Iran’s program and rolling back some of its most threatening elements.

Despite criticism from the right, the interim agreement is heavily lopsided in favor of the United States and the other powers seeking to contain the Iranian threat. In fact, as a short-term deal, this is an unmitigated victory for the United States.

However, there is a long road ahead before the P5+1 will be able to reach a permanent solution to the Iran crisis, and some barriers to that deal may become evident as soon as this month.

Two major issues have become apparent since the interim agreement was announced.

The first concerns Iran’s sovereign right, codified in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to have a domestic uranium enrichment program for peaceful purposes, such as nuclear power generation and medical nuclear isotope production. This has been Iran’s explanation of its activities since its discovery, but Western states, especially Israel, have not accepted that explanation in the face of missile program development and other steps toward latent nuclear weapons capability.

A long-term agreement must reduce uncertainty surrounding Iran’s intentions for enrichment, whether Iran accepts the proposal or not. The P5+1 will have to recognize officially Iran’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment up to 20 percent. While Israel seeks the total dismantling of the Iranian program, this demand ignores fundamental rights granted to Iran under the NPT, and more importantly guarantees Iran’s refusal of the deal, reverting the crisis to the prior status quo. That status quo is worse for the United States, Israel and the world than a deal accepting Iran’s right to enrich to non-weaponized levels.

The second major question concerns military facilities in Iran such as Parchin, where enrichment activity is suspected to be taking place alongside work at civilian facilities. While the interim agreement is unclear about the mandate for inspections of Parchin, the long-term deal must include such sites, or else the agreement will encourage the movement of enrichment work to military facilities and allow Iran to continue toward latent nuclear weapons capability.

Inspections must continue as frequently as every day, with inspections of multiple sites in a given day allowed. Any denial of IAEA inspections at any facility, military or civilian, must be treated as a violation of the agreement. Otherwise, the world can expect years of diversion, deception, redirection and diplomatic standoffs over disputed inspection sites and schedules, as we have seen in inspection programs with weaker mandates.

Finally, in order to make such a deal acceptable to Iran, the P5+1 must be willing to roll back most of the remaining financial and trade sanctions against Iran on a schedule dependent on compliance with the inspections process. Economic sanctions cannot be endless, treated as punishment for past transgressions. Without the promise of eventual normalization of relations, Iran’s moderates may not be able to convince the hard-liners to accept a final deal. Initial reductions in sanctions could focus on the reversible financial sanctions, such as those on Iran’s central bank, after all parties agree on the timetable for initial inspections. After the initial inspections and related disclosures are complete, the non-oil trade sanctions could be lifted, followed by the lifting of oil-related sanctions after a full year of successful cooperation with IAEA inspections.

If Iran were to accept this long-term deal, the international community could effectively prevent Iran from achieving breakout nuclear capability or building a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to reject the proposal, despite being offered formal recognition of its right to enrich and eventual lifting of all financial and trade sanctions, its intention to reach nuclear weapons capability would be indisputable.

The steps taken by Iran and the P5+1 are praiseworthy and significant, but it is important to use the next six months to reach a durable, realistic and permanent solution.

Stephen Long is an assistant professor of political science and international studies at the University of Richmond.